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In social network markets, the act of
consumer choice in these industries is gov-
erned not just by the set of incentives
described by conventional consumer de-
mand theory, but by the choices of oth-
ers in which an individuals payoff is an
explicit function of the actions of oth-
ers. We observe two key empirical fea-
tures of outcomes in social networked mar-
kets. First, a highly right-skewed, non-
Gaussian distribution of the number of
times competing alternatives are selected
at a point in time. Second, there is
turnover in the rankings of popularity over
time. We show here that such outcomes
can arise either when there is no alter-
native which exhibits inherent superiority
in its attributes, or when agents find it
very difficult to discern any differences in
quality amongst the alternatives which are
available so that it is as if no superiority
exists. These features appear to obtain,
as a reasonable approximation, in many
social network markets. We examine the
impact of network structure on both the
rank-size distribution of choices at a point
in time, and on the life spans of the most
popular choices. We show that a key in-
fluence on outcomes is the extent to which
the network follows a hierarchical struc-
ture. It is the social network properties
of the markets, the meso-level structure,
which determine outcomes rather than the
objective attributes of the products.
1 Introduction
Potts et al. (2008) argue that the analytical
foundation for the cultural and creative indus-
tries is best provided by taking the perspective
of an emergent market economy rather than an
industrial one. They describe these industries,
and others which share their fundamental fea-
tures, as ‘social network markets’.
They suggest that “the very act of consumer
choice in these industries is governed not just by
the set of incentives described by conventional
consumer demand theory, but by the choices of
others in which an individuals payoff is an ex-
plicit function of the actions of others.” Ex-
amples are given by Arthur (1989), Brock and
Durlauf (2001, 2010), De Vany and Walls (1996),
Ormerod (1998, 2005, 2007), Kretschmer et al.



















(2009). These phenomena, which Schelling
(1973) described generally as “binary decisions
with externalities,” clearly apply generally to the
creative industries (e.g., De Vany 2004, Potts
2006, Beck 2007).
A key question when considering how agents
choose between alternatives in such networked
markets is whether those alternatives which are
superior to others in terms of their attributes
come to the fore. In other words, are superior
alternatives more likely to be chosen than ones
which are in some sense inferior? This is obvi-
ously important in not just in modern cultural
and creative markets, but in areas such as the
diffusion of innovation and technology (for ex-
ample, Antonelli, ed., 2011). It also appears
in such disparate contexts as foraging theory in
early human societies (Winterhalder and Smith
2000), and in prehistoric choices of ceramic pot-
tery (Neiman 1995).
Different approaches have been proposed in
addressing this question. In the economics litera-
ture, the seminal paper of Akerlof (1970) showed
that the inter-action between the heterogeneity
of quality amongst the alternatives and asym-
metric information amongst agents, so that some
or even all agents lack complete information, can
lead not only to superior alternatives being with-
drawn from the market, but to the market ceas-
ing to function at all. Simon (1955) argued that,
in general, agents lack the processing capacity to
select the optimal choice, even when, indeed es-
pecially when, complete information is available.
Arthur (1989) considered agents who choose be-
tween two competing variants of a new technol-
ogy; they lack the information which would en-
able them to distinguish between their qualities,
and as a consequence the inferior technology can
capture the entire market.
As Earls and Potts (2004) point out, the is-
sue is not just that agents have incomplete or
asymmetric information, but also that they have
different and possibly better or more experienced
choice rules. In other words, we might still ex-
pect to observe this behaviour even when there
is not asymmetric or distributed information.
Recent social network models from the net-
work literature have focused on the issues of the
dynamics of popularity and the process by which
‘superior’ alternatives come to the fore. A sem-
inal contribution was made by Lieberman et al.
(2005). They used an established evolutionary
model to capture the process of selection and
choice. They showed that the probability that
a new, better invention becomes adopted widely
depends in a fundamental way on the social net-
work structure.
Hierarchical networks, for example, did a bet-
ter job at ensuring that inherently superior op-
tions would be adopted across the population.
Diffused or random networks tended to minimise
the advantage of any inherent superiority. In one
extreme category of diffuse networks, the supe-
rior option had almost no advantage, whereas in
the other limit of extremely hierarchical network
structure, any superiority of a new invention was
bound to be picked up and spread.
In this paper, we examine the impact of net-
work structure on the two key empirical features
of social network markets, which we describe be-
low. We do so in contexts in which either there
is no alternative which exhibits inherent superi-
ority in its attributes, or in which agents find it
very difficult to discern any differences in quality
amongst the alternatives which are available so
that it is as if no superiority exists.
In the marketing literature, a seminal analysis
of such markets was carried out by Ehrenberg
(1959), who considered consumer markets in
which consumers effectively guessed from among
the choices available. He assumed that choice
“incidence tends to be so irregular that it can be
regarded as if random”, (Goodhart, Ehrenberg
et al. 1984) and from this he predicted a nega-
tive binomial distribution of variant popularity.
Certainly, there is now a stupendous vari-
ety of choices available in many consumer mar-
kets. Consider, for example, what Beinhocker
(2007) has said about the plethora of consumer
choices for the average New Yorker: “The Wal-
Mart near JFK Airport has over 100,000 dif-
ferent items in stock, there are over200 televi-
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sion channels offered on cable TV, Barnes and
Noble lists over 8 million titles, the local su-
permarket has 275 varieties of breakfast cereal,
the typical department store offers 150 types of
lipstick, and there are over 50,000 restaurants
in New York City alone.” At the stock keep-
ing unit level (SKU), the level of product detail
at which retailers specify their restocking orders,
Beinhocker estimates that on a single day in New
York, there are 10 billion (!) such choices avail-
able. There may indeed be objective differences
between the various offers, but in such numer-
ous, minor and often incomprehensible ways that
they exemplify what has come to be called ‘de-
cision quicksand’ (Sela and Berger 2011) or ‘de-
cision fatigue’ (Baumeister and Tierney 2011).
In such circumstances, the plethora of choice
makes processing of the information in the clas-
sical rational economic sense effectively impos-
sible. Rosen (1981) analysed the economics of
superstars. His model was generalised by Adler
(1985, 2006) to examine the consumer side where
having and sharing knowledge and information
about artistic goods minimises searching costs
(time), generating learning effects and positive
externalities, even when the top few ‘superstars’
are not necessarily objectively better than the
rest of the alternatives.
We therefore examine the impact of network
structure on outcomes in social network markets
in which we assume that none of the alternative
offers which are available have any intrinsic su-
periority over any of the others.
We focus our attention on the impact of net-
work structure on two key empirical outcomes of
social network markets. First, the popularity of
different choices at a point in time follows a right-
skewed, non-Gaussian distribution. The music
download experiment of Salganik et al. (2006),
for example, shows how the impact of social net-
works dramatically increases the non-Gaussian
features of the statistical distribution of the out-
come of choice made about different alternatives.
A slightly irreverent but highly relevant example
is given by Godart and Mears (2009). They stud-
ied the Style.com show reports for Spring 2007
and found that designers used a total of 677 fash-
ion models worldwide for their shows. Over 75
per cent of the total who appeared, were in 5
shows or less. Only 60 women in the entire mod-
elling universe walked in more than 20 shows,
with the market leader of the time, Coco Rocha,
being featured in 55 shows. Many aspirants, of
course, featured in none.
Kahneman (2011, chapter 17) hypothesises
that sales of competing alternatives tends to ex-
hibit regression to the mean. The heavily right
skewed nature of outcomes in social network
markets requires that this statement be qualified
substantially. In the long run, in social network
markets, the process of evolution which drives
them means that the sales of any product will fall
to zero. So the long-run mean is zero. However,
in the short-term – and the illustrative example
provided by Kahneman is one-step ahead projec-
tion – the self-reinforcing nature of the process of
choice means that products which are rising in
popularity will in general exhibit the complete
opposite of mean reversion.
The second key empirical feature is that there
is turnover in the rankings of popularity over
time. Ormerod (2012) provides numerous exam-
ples of both these phenomena.
We examine the impact of network structure
on these two features of social network markets.
We find that the network structure can have sub-
stantial effects on the extent of skewness in the
distribution and on the speed of turnover in the
rankings.
We consider four distinct large networks that
match those studied by Lieberman et al. (2005)
which, from the least hierarchical to the most
hierarchical, were: (a) a square lattice, where
agents copy other agents near them on a grid,
(b) a fully connected network, where each agent
can copy any other agent, (c) a “meta-funnel”
network, where the structure funnels out from
a central agent, and (d) a “superstar” network,
where agents are grouped and a central agent is
connected to all groups.
Section 2 describes the behavioural model of
agent choice and the network structures exam-
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ined. Section 3 sets out the results, and section
4 offers a brief discussion and conclusion.
2 Models and methods
Given that, by assumption, agents at any point
in time make a choice amongst a large number
of indistinguishable alternatives, the behavioural
model of economics, that of rational selection on
the basis of objective information, is not rele-
vant, even when it is modified to take into ac-
count imperfect and asymmetric information.
2.1 Model
Given that, by assumption, agents at any point
in time make a choice amongst a large number
of indistinguishable alternatives, the behavioural
model of economics, that of rational selection
on the basis of objective information, faces chal-
lenges, even when it is modified to take into ac-
count imperfect and asymmetric information. If
rationality is defined as maximizing utility sub-
ject to constraints, but every possible good is
effectively identical, then every good will be in
the argmax of the utility, and therefore every
good will be chosen with equal probability. This
is essentially the argument of Ehrenberg (1959).
Our evolutionary choice model, however, differs
from this. As a heuristic in such circumstances,
agents essentially choose with a probability equal
to the number of times any given alternative has
been selected as a proportion of the total num-
ber of selections made across the agents to which
the agent is connected. They may, for example,
regard other agents as having more information
than they do, and hence copy their behaviour.
In economics, Brock and Durlauf (1999, 2001,
2010), and Young (2009, 2011), for example,
have explored the effects of social interactions
and social diffusion in great depth. Here we
hope to contribute a complementary behavioural
model of a different nature, developed from the
cultural evolution literature, which has been
shown to be capable of explaining empirical out-
comes in a wide range of different contexts. A
majority of agents in a population copy one an-
other in an effectively undirected manner, and
the (small) minority innovate their own original
behaviours. Lieberman et al. (2005) used a sim-
ilar copying model. In terms of understanding
the behaviour of this model, there are examples
from biological sciences (Hahn 2008), marketing
science (Goodhardt et al. 1984), and economics
(Ijiri and Simon 1964). Practical applications,
with favourable comparison to real-world data,
include baby names (Hahn and Bentley 2003),
English words (Bentley 2008; Reali and Griffiths
2004), prehistoric pottery designs (Neiman 1995)
and key features of linguistic evolution (Bentley
et al. 2011a). A generalisation of the model is
given by Bentley et al. (2011b, 2011c).
This modelling approach differs from that
based upon the concept of rational addiction
with preferences which are learned and are inter–
temporally dependent (for example, Becker and
Murphy 1988, Britto and Barros 2005). Agents
are not required to learn preferences over time.
In the cultural evolution literature, the prefer-
ences of any given agent are not formed over
time. At any point in time, an agent makes
a choice based simply on the choices made by
others, with a small probability of random in-
novation in making their selection. As noted
above, this choice rule could be used because
an agent might believe others to possess either
superior information or superior decision rules.
Strong evidence for the effectiveness of copying
as the basis for decisions is provide by the social
learning tournament organised by Rendell et al.
(2010). There is also well documented psycho-
logical evidence as to why agents might make use
of this decision rule, such as the desire to con-
form (e.g., Asch (1955), Moscovici et al. 1969)
or the influence of peer acceptance (e.g., Chris-
tiakis and Fowler 2007; Ormerod and Wiltshire
2009; Rivera et al. 2010)
The model proceeds as follows: There are N
agents in a fixed network. There are initially
N possible choices, and we initialise the model
with a unique and distinct choice being assigned
to each agent. In each period, every agent can
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t = 0 t = 1
Figure 1: A simple representation of the neutral
model. Shown are four individuals for two suc-
cessive time steps. At each time step, we refresh
the population with new individuals, and each
is given a new copy of a variant (represented
by the shading within the circles). Each vari-
ant is assigned a new value by either (a) copying
a randomly-selected individual from the previ-
ous time step, with equal probability of choosing
any individual, or (b) inventing a new variant
(e.g. dotted shading) with probability µ, which
in this example is 0.25 (one our of the four indi-
viduals).
make a choice. With probability 1−µ the agent
selects a choice with a probability proportional
to the number of agents that it is connected to
that have made that choice in the previous pe-
riod, and with probability µ, the agent selects a
new choice that is different from all previously
available choices. Considerable anthropological
and socioeconomic evidence exists (e.g., Eerkens
2000; Diederen et al. 2003; Srinivasan and Ma-
son 1986; Larsen 1961; Rogers 1962) on the plau-
sible values for µ being no greater than 0.1.
An intuitive understanding of the model is
given in Fig. 1.
We initialise the model at t = 0 by letting each
agent select its own choice, represented here by a
colour. So the agent in the top left selects ‘grey’
for example. When we move to t = 1, agents
have the choice of copying the choice of any agent
to which it is connected or, with a small prob-
ability, making a completely new choice. There
are many possible configurations that can result
from this at t = 1, and only one such configu-
ration is represented in the figure. For example,
the top-left agent switched from grey to black by
copying the agent at the bottom right at time
t = 0. This is possible since this agent is con-
nected to a black node and a light grey one. On
the other hand, it could not have switched to
white. Similarly, the bottom-left agent switched
from black to white, and the bottom-right agent
switched from light grey to grey. Finally, the top-
right agent switched from whited to striped. In
other words, this latter agent experimented, by
selecting a choice that had not previously been
made.
We ran this model 500 independent times over
each of four different large network structures
(approximately 475 nodes), and for 2000 peri-
ods each time. The different network structures
were chosen to resemble the network arrange-
ments studied in Lieberman et al. (2005). We
also varied the experimentation parameter µ, al-
lowing it to take the values 0, 0.25%, 0.5%, 0.
75%, 1% and 5%.
For each run of the model, we recorded:
• The distribution of choices ranked by popu-
larity
• The life spans of the top 100 longest surviv-
ing choices
• The life spans of the top 100 most popular
choices (measured by the total number of
times the choice was selected over the run
of the model)
• The number of choices that are counted
among the top 100 longest survivors and the
top 100 most popular
Since the model was run 500 independent
times over each network, we obtained the aver-
ages over the 500 runs of the above statistics.
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2.2 Network structures
The four network structures are those examined
in Lieberman et al., to facilitate direct compari-
son between social network markets in which one
of the alternatives is superior in its attributes to
those of the others, and markets in which none
of the alternatives is superior.
The key difference between them which is rel-
evant in this context is the extent to which they
have a hierarchical structure. In other words, the
extent to which there is a small number of highly
connected nodes which therefore have the poten-
tial to exercise a strong influence on the outcome.
Details of the graph theoretic properties of the
networks are available from the authors, and here
we set out a brief description.
The four network structures, represented in
Fig. 2, can intuitively be ranked from least to
most hierarchical as follows: (1) the square lat-
tice structure, (2) the fully connected network,
(3) the metafunnel, and finally (4) the superstar.
They are all undirected, and have approximately
475 nodes each, although the precise number de-
pends on the parameterisation of the network in
question, which we discuss in Sect. 2.2.
The square lattice is a network arrangement
that is determined by one parameter: n. The
nodes are placed on an n-by-n square grid and
each node is connected to the nodes directly
above and below it, and to the nodes directly to
the left and right of it (there is no wrap around
the sides of the grid). The number of nodes
in such a network is given by n2. We have set
n = 22, thus resulting in 484 nodes.
The fully connected network is simply a net-
work in which every node is connected with ev-
ery other node. It is the special case that cor-
responds to the neutral model of Bentley et al.
(2011a, 2011b) when the memory parameter is
set to one. The number of nodes was set at
n = 475.
The metafunnel is a network arrangement that
is determined by three parameters: k, steps, and
g. There is a “central” node that is connected
to g groups of nodes, each group consisting of k
nodes. Every node in some group is then con-
nected to the same k2 nodes outward from the
central node, and then those nodes are them-
selves connected to the same k3 nodes, and so
on. That is, any node that is n steps away from
the central node is connected to kn+1 nodes. We
chose k = 5 over 3 steps with g = 3, which results
in 466 nodes.
The superstar is a network arrangement that
is determined by two parameters: s and h. There
is a central node that is connected to every node.
The nodes are divided into h groups, each of size
s. In each group there is a dominant node that
is connected to every other node in the group,
while all the other nodes within the group are not
directly connected to each other. The number of
nodes in such a network is given by 1 + sh. The
parameters were set to s = 24, and h = 20, thus
resulting in 481 nodes.
3 Results
The expected number of choices at the end of
a model run is approximated by n(1 + µ(T −
1)), so for µ = 0.0025, for example, there are
almost 3,000 alternatives from which to choose
whilst with µ = 0.05, this number rises to some
50,000. But even with very low values of µ, a
large number of choices exist.
Fig. 3 shows the resulting rank-size distribu-
tion of choices after 2,000 steps of the model for
different value of µ, the innovation parameter.
We sum the results across all the individual solu-
tions of the model and divide by the total num-
ber of solutions. The most frequently selected
alternative has rank 1, the second most frequent
rank 2, and so on.
It is known (Neiman, 1995, Bentley et al.
2011b) that as the value of the innovation param-
eter, µ, approaches zero, the outcome approaches
a winner-take-all distribution. A small number
of alternatives are selected by large numbers of
agents, with most choices being selected by few.
The scale on the left hand axes of Fig. 3 con-
firms this, with, for example, the top value of
the chart when µ = 0.0025 being a whole order
of magnitude greater than when µ = 0.05.
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Figure 2: The idealised networks described in the text, including a square lattice (upper left), a fully
connected network (upper right), a “meta-funnel” network (lower left), and a “superstar” network
(lower right).
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Figure 3: The resulting rank-size distribution of choices after 2,000 steps of the model for different
value of µ, the innovation parameter.
All the resulting distributions are highly right-
skewed and non-Gaussian. In general, the more
hierarchical is the network structure, the more
unequal is the resulting distribution amongst the
alternatives which are selected. The alternatives
which are selected most frequently in the case of
the superstar network, for example, are chosen
considerably more times than the highest ranked
with the other distributions.
The scale of the charts might tend to deceive,
but close inspection shows that the number of
times the highest ranked alternative is selected
with the superstar network is typically an order
of magnitude greater than with the other net-
work structures. Table 1illustrates this point.
Fig. 4 shows the lifespans of the top 100
longest-surviving choices (where the lifespan of
a choice is the number of periods for which the
choice is selected by some node, starting from
the period at which it is first selected to the pe-
riod after which no agents select it). In gen-
eral the less hierarchical the network, the more
egalitarian the outcome tends to be; that is, the
more similar the lifespan of the longest and 100th
longest choices tends to be.
Fig. 5 shows the lifespans of the top 100 most
popular choices. In other words, the 100 with
the highest number of being selected over all the
solutions. It is important to note that in all net-
work structures, the top 100 longest- surviving
choices are often distinct from the top 100 most
popular choices. In fact, Table 2 shows that the
intersection of these two sets is often quite nar-
row, where, at best, approximately 20 choices are
among both the top 100 most popular and top
100 longest–surviving.
Finally, Table 3 shows that average number
of “active” choices per period in each of the net-
works - where a choice is said to be active in some
period if it is being selected by at least 5 nodes in
that period. Clearly, the average number of “ac-
tive” choices is increasing in the experimentation
parameter µ for each network, and for a given µ
it appears to decrease the more hierarchical the
network is.
4 Discussion
It might be imagined that if it is not possible for
agents to distinguish between the attributes of
alternative choices, so that it is as if no one alter-
native is superior to any other, that the resulting
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Table 1: The number of times the top ranked (by popularity) alternative is selected after 2000
periods (average over 500 runs).
µ squarelattice connected metafunnel superstar
0 553422 733172 502469 951377
0.0025 134953 197937 165195 401787
0.005 61058 94358 86592 250758
0.0075 37412 57677 55593 176312
0.01 25396 38612 41468 141457
0.05 2250 3386 4432 24706

















































Figure 4: Distributions of the lifespans of the top 100 longest-surviving choices, for different net-
works and different value of µ.
Table 2: Average number of choices that are among the 100 most popular and the top 100 most
long-lived
µ = 0 µ = 0.0025 µ = 0.005 µ = 0.0075 µ = 0.01 µ = 0.05
Square lattice 20.51 3.33 1.86 1.4 0.99 0.24
Connected 21.12 3.55 2.00 1.36 1.00 0.22
Metafunnel 21.09 3.47 1.92 1.34 0.99 0.17
Superstar 22.89 3.60 2.00 1.39 1.11 0.24
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Figure 5: Distributions of the lifespans of the top 100 most popular choices, for different networks
and different value of µ.
Table 3: Average number of active curves per period
µ = 0 µ = 0.0025 µ = 0.005 µ = 0.0075 µ = 0.01 µ = 0.05
Square lattice 4.39 13.62 19.17 22.96 25.95 32.90
Connected 2.73 9.00 13.25 16.49 19.10 31.04
Metafunnel 3.01 7.23 10.15 12.45 14.38 28.10
Superstar 1.09 1.65 2.17 2.67 3.13 8.33
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distribution of the number of times each alter-
native is selected will be uniformly distributed.
However, this is most decidedly not the case. We
observe marked right–skewed non–Gaussian out-
comes, as in the real world of social network mar-
kets, in which decisive ‘winners’ emerge.
Rank-size distributions become steeper the
more hierarchical the network structure, ap-
proaching a winner–take–all distribution in the
case of the superstar network. Lifespans are
shorter in more hierarchical networks, but when-
ever there is a winner, it grows much larger in
more hierarchical structures than in less hier-
archical ones. Our results may predict conse-
quences for abrupt, ‘tipping points’ in network
structure, such as that discovered by Achlioptas
et al. (2009) for sudden coalescence into sparse
hierarchical networks, as has been observed for
Wikipedia (Bounova 2009).
We can think of the relation between these re-
sults and the characteristics of the network struc-
tures. For example, we are led to the conclusion
that choices spread quickly and to a larger frac-
tion of the population not in better connected
networks (that is, the fully connected network),
but in more hierarchical ones. This is because
there is more ‘noise’ in better connected net-
works – captured by the number of active choices
per period. So adding connections does not nec-
essarily help in improving the speed or scale at
which a choice spreads. This is essentially what
the meso level structure (Foster and Potts 2006)
does indeed suggest: namely that there is a lot
of choice heuristics and value embedded in insti-
tutions
Note that neither the average degree nor the
degree variance in the networks explains our re-
sults. As argued above, a higher average degree
(such as in the fully connected network) does not
lead to faster or wider spread. Similarly, the de-
gree variance is higher in the square lattice than
in the fully connected network, so this cannot
fully capture our intuitive hierarchical ranking.
However, spread is related to degree skewness.
That is, spread does seem to be larger and faster
in networks where there are relatively few but
very well-connected nodes (and the rest – the
majority – are not very well connected).
Overall, the results are shaped strongly by the
features of the networks. This supports the ar-
gument of Foster and Potts (2006) that in social
network markets, it is the meso–level structure
(i.e. population and system level) which essen-
tially determines the features which are observed
at the macro-level (non–Gaussian rank–size dis-
tributions, turnover in rankings through time).
5 Conclusion
Social network markets pose challenges to eco-
nomic theorists, as described by Potts et al.
(2008). We have used an evolutionary perspec-
tive to try to develop more insights into the na-
ture of these markets. We find that that a clear
winner emerges in social network markets even
when, by assumption, there is no inherent supe-
riority of any of the alternative choices available
to agents. The outcome becomes more ‘winner-
take-all’ the more hierarchical is the network
structure.
The stylised facts of social network markets
can be obtained from a model in which, by de-
liberate assumption, no alternative is superior to
any of the others. This may seem a surprising
conclusion. However, even a brief acquaintance
with the most popular picture on Flickr or the
most popular videos on YouTube will, on most
days, offer powerful casual empirical support for
this conclusion.
Lieberman et al. (2005) examined the re-
lationship between network structure and the
propensity of an alternative which, by assump-
tion, was superior, to be selected by large num-
bers of agents. They showed that choices spread
more rapidly and widely in more hierarchical net-
works.
Our paper demonstrates that this seems to be
a very general principle of social network mar-
kets. It is a feature of such markets regardless of
whether agents are able to distinguish between
the objective attributes of competing alterna-
tives. These results confirm that choices spread
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more rapidly and widely in more hierarchical so-
cial networks. A clear winner emerges in hierar-
chical networks even without any inherent supe-
riority.
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